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Recap; Kohler v. Keller Transport, Inc.; Westchester Surplus Lines
Insurance Company v. Keller Transport, Inc.: After a Confessed
Judgment, is an Insurer Entitled to a Reasonableness Hearing in the
Underlying Tort Action?
Kristen Zadick
Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278 Montana Supreme Court

Oral Argument: Friday, September 11, 2015, at 10:00 AM in the Holiday
Inn Missoula Downtown, Missoula, Montana.
I. JONATHAN HACKER FOR APPELLANT WESTCHESTER SURPLUS LINES
INSURANCE COMPANY (“WESTCHESTER”)
Mr. Hacker opened his argument by asserting Westchester
performed everything required of it under the insurance policy and more.
As required by the policy, Westchester advanced payment for clean-up
following the gasoline spill. Additionally, Westchester paid the insureds’
defense costs up to the $4 million commercial automobile limit, even
though the terms of the policy did not create a duty to provide a defense.
Questions from the justices largely centered on three topics: (1)
the construction of Westchester’s excess insurance policy in light of both
the primary insurance policy issued by Carolina and a federallyprescribed endorsement to the excess insurance policy; (2) the
implication of commercial general liability (“CGL”) coverage; and (3)
the reasonableness hearing held in the Missoula County district court.
The justices challenged the interpretation of the excess insurance
policy on several levels. Justice Shea inquired whether the excess policy
applied in the same manner as the primary policy issued by Carolina
since the excess policy followed the form of the primary policy. Justice
Shea noted that if the excess policy followed the form of the primary
policy, the excess policy should provide separate limits for both
commercial automobile coverage and CGL coverage, as the primary
policy did. Mr. Hacker responded that the excess and primary policies
differed because the primary policy did not contain an aggregate limit,
while the excess policy issued by Westchester included such a limit.
According to Mr. Hacker, although the excess policy followed the form
of the primary policy, it did so only in that it provided coverage for the
same types of occurrences as the primary policy.
Questions regarding the MCS-90 endorsement, which is an
endorsement to the excess insurance policy required by federal law,
focused on the effect of the endorsement on the interpretation of the
policy, namely the “general aggregate.” Justice Baker asked Mr. Hacker
to address the Missoula County District Court’s determination that the
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MCS-90 supported an ambiguity in the excess insurance policy. Mr.
Hacker responded that the endorsement was irrelevant to the
interpretation of the policy language and did not change the limits under
the excess policy. Rather, the endorsement is meant to assure the public
that certain motor carriers satisfy minimum insurance requirements.
Justice Shea questioned the express language of the MCS-90
endorsement that indicated the endorsement changed the excess policy.
In response, Mr. Hacker again emphasized the endorsement did not
expand coverage and Westchester should not be held responsible for
ambiguities that arise from the endorsement because Westchester did not
author the federally-prescribed endorsement. Additionally, Mr. Hacker
noted no federal cases have interpreted the endorsement to expand or
alter coverage limits.
Mr. Hacker argued Westchester did not breach a duty to defend
its insureds because the excess policy expressly allowed for an option,
but not a duty, to participate in the insureds’ defense. Under an option to
defend, Mr. Hacker noted an insurer may withdraw from the defense so
long as the withdrawal does not prejudice the insured. Mr. Hacker argued
Westchester properly withdrew from the defense upon exhausting the
limits. Because trial was more than a year away at the time of
Westchester’s withdrawal, the insureds did not suffer prejudice.
In response to Chief Justice McGrath’s prompting, Mr. Hacker
addressed the adequacy of the reasonableness hearing held in the
Missoula County declaratory judgment action. Mr. Hacker argued the
reasonableness hearing was inadequate because the wrong decisionmaker conducted the hearing and the district court used the incorrect
standard to review the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. Mr.
Hacker argued Judge Langton should have conducted the hearing in the
tort action because that court had a better understanding of the facts
underlying the judgment because it entered the confessed judgment.
Further, Mr. Hacker argued the Missoula County District Court erred by
considering only the Homeowners’ evidence. Justice Shea noted the
Missoula County District Court applied the same standard used to set
aside a jury verdict, finding the amount fell within the range a jury could
have awarded. In response, Mr. Hacker advocated for the standard set in
Tidyman’s v. Management Services, Incorporated v. Davis,
1
which requires the insurer to present sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the amount of the
judgment. Mr. Hacker argued that because the insurer bears the burden to
demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the district court should have
permitted Westchester to conduct discovery and cross examine the
opposing party’s expert witnesses.

1

330 P.3d 1139, 1154 (Mont. 2014).

2015

RECAP; KOHLER V. KELLER TRANSPORT, INC.

145

II. ROGER SULLIVAN FOR APPELLEES HOMEOWNERS
Mr. Sullivan opened his argument by noting Westchester’s
appeal hinged on a special definition of a $4 million “general aggregate”
limit, but the insurer failed to define the term.
Questions from the justices focused on several topics: (1) the
effect of the MCS-90 endorsement on the interpretation of the policy; (2)
the number of occurrences that triggered coverage under the excess
policy; and (3) the adequacy of the reasonableness hearing.
Mr. Sullivan noted that because the Westchester policy followed
the form of the Carolina policy, the excess policy provided by
Westchester should have applied in a manner similar to Carolina’s
policy. Because the Carolina policy provided separate limits for
automobile and CGL coverage, Westchester’s policy should have
provided separate limits. The form following nature of the excess
insurance policy contradicted Westchester’s argument that “general
aggregate” referred to the total limits under the excess insurance policy.
Mr. Sullivan argued this contradiction created an ambiguity in the policy,
and ambiguities are construed against the author of the policy. As the
author of the policy, Westchester had the ability to define “general
aggregate” but failed to do so.
Mr. Sullivan argued that the language of the MCS-90
endorsement emphasized the ambiguity because the endorsement
changed the policy by providing that the policy limits applied separately.
Justice Baker inquired whether any other cases, particularly federal
cases, used the MCS-90 federal endorsement to determine the limits of
the insurance policy. Mr. Sullivan did not directly address Justice
Baker’s inquiry, but clarified that the Missoula County District Court did
not use the endorsement to determine the limits of the policy. Rather, in
light of Westchester’s reliance on an undefined term, the district court
reviewed the entire policy, including the MCS-90 endorsement, to define
“general aggregate.” The district court did not interpret the endorsement,
but rather considered the endorsement in its interpretation of “general
aggregate.”
Justices Shea and McKinnon expressed concern as to the number
of occurrences that triggered insurance coverage. In response to Justice
Shea, Mr. Sullivan noted that two separate events triggered both the
commercial automobile coverage and the CGL coverage. The first
occurrence, the roll-over accident, triggered the commercial automobile
coverage. The damages caused through the clean-up efforts triggered the
CGL coverage. Justice McKinnon next asked whether both insurers
acknowledged the two triggering events. Mr. Sullivan noted that
although both insurers initially denied the implication of CGL coverage,
Carolina later recognized the implication of the CGL coverage.
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Turning to the breach argument, Mr. Sullivan argued that once
Westchester started to defend the trucking companies, it assumed a duty
to continue that defense and the insureds had reasonable expectations
that Westchester would continue the defense. Mr. Sullivan noted
Westchester’s unilateral withdrawal caused the insureds prejudice
because the insureds’ attorney fees went unpaid for a number of months.
Mr. Sullivan argued Westchester should have followed the procedure
recommended by the Montana Supreme Court. The Court recommends
that the insurer continue its defense under a reservation of rights and file
a declaratory judgment action to determine whether coverage exists
under the policy.2
Finally, Mr. Sullivan analyzed the adequacy of the
reasonableness hearing held in the declaratory judgment action. Mr.
Sullivan framed his argument by explaining the course of action an
insured may take after the insurer breaches its duty to defend by
prematurely withdrawing from the defense. Mr. Sullivan noted that
insureds acted within their rights by entering a confessed judgment with
the injured party. Although judgment amounts must be reasonable, Mr.
Sullivan noted the Missoula County district court found the amount to be
reasonable. Mr. Sullivan argued Judge McLean properly reviewed the
Homeowners’ expert reports, which contained all the relevant damage
information, and determined that the amount fell within the range of
what a jury could reasonably award. Justice Shea questioned why the
review took place in the Missoula court, and Mr. Sullivan responded a
reasonableness review can be conducted wherever judicial efficiency so
requires.
Finally, Justice Baker asked Mr. Sullivan to respond to
Westchester’s argument that the court reviewing the reasonableness of a
judgment cannot make a determination without allowing the party
opposing the judgment to cross-examine the proponent’s expert
witnesses. Mr. Sullivan responded that Westchester failed to carry the
burden imposed on the insurer by Tidyman’s to produce evidence
creating a genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the judgment.
Concluding his argument, Mr. Sullivan argued Judge McLean was better
suited to review the judgment amount because he was acquainted with
the record. Mr. Sullivan added that to give the reasonableness hearing to
Judge Langton, who was not as acquainted with the record, would violate
Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, which calls for the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of proceedings.3
III. MR. HACKER’S REBUTTAL

2
3

Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 386 (Mont. 2004).
MONT. R. CIV. P. 1.
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Mr. Hacker’s rebuttal began with a question from Justice
McKinnon seeking clarification as to whether the circumstances
implicated CGL coverage and whether Westchester left the coverage
untapped. In his response, Mr. Hacker emphasized the insureds
themselves did not believe the facts implicated CGL coverage. Seeking a
clear answer to Justice McKinnon’s inquiry, Justice Shea asked whether
Westchester’s policy provided both automobile and CGL coverage. Mr.
Hacker conceded that although the excess policy followed the form of
the Carolina policy, which provided both automobile and CGL coverage,
Westchester’s excess policy did not provide for separate automobile and
CGL coverage. Rather, the excess policy followed form only in that it
covered the same types of occurrences that Carolina’s primary policy
covered. Mr. Hacker clarified the Westchester policy did not follow the
form of the Carolina policy as to the limits.
In his rebuttal, Mr. Hacker emphasized two points. First, the
MCS-90 endorsement did not alter the coverage limits between
Westchester and its insureds, and as such the district court incorrectly
relied on the endorsement to find an addition $4 million in CGL
coverage. Second, the “general aggregate” limit applied to the total limits
available under the excess policy. Citing the relationship and course of
dealing between Westchester and its insureds, Mr. Hacker noted the
insureds themselves never thought the CGL coverage applied to the
claim.
As a final matter, Justice Shea asked Mr. Hacker to elaborate on
the reasonableness hearing. Mr. Hacker argued the court that entered the
confessed judgment should have conducted the hearing to review the
reasonableness of the judgment. Further, Mr. Hacker argued the court
that held the hearing should have permitted Westchester to conduct
discovery and cross-examine the Homeowners’ expert witnesses.
IV. PREDICTIONS
The Court’s principal concerns focused on the construction of
Westchester’s excess insurance policy and the adequacy of the
reasonableness hearing, and both Mr. Hacker and Mr. Sullivan stressed
the two issues. The effect of both the Carolina policy and the federal
endorsement on the excess policy may be dispositive of the coverage and
breach issues. The adequacy of the reasonableness hearing in the
Missoula County district court likely depends upon whether the Missoula
County district court employed the proper standard in its review of the
confessed judgment.
The Court may find Westchester’s excess policy provided
additional CGL coverage because the Westchester policy followed the
form of the Carolina policy, which provided separate limits for both
automobile and CGL coverage. Because Westchester conceded the
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excess policy followed the form of Carolina’s policy, the excess policy
should apply in a like manner, providing separate limits for automobile
and CGL coverage. Although Westchester noted the policy disclaimed a
duty to defend and contained a “general aggregate” limit, the language
conflicts with the form following nature of the policy. Because the
conflict creates an ambiguity, and Westchester failed to define a term it
relied upon to deny coverage, the Court may find Westchester
improperly withdrew from the defense, and in doing so, breached its duty
to defend. As Mr. Sullivan argued, an insurer’s breach of its duty to
defend makes the insurer liable for judgments against its insured, even
those in excess of policy limits.4
Although the justices’ questions focused heavily on the role of
the federal MCS-90 endorsement, the Court may find the endorsement
does not change the ambiguity created between the policy language and
the form following nature of the excess policy. While Westchester
argued the endorsement itself does not alter the limits of its policy, the
Court may find the Missoula County District Court’s use of the
endorsement to support its finding does not merit reversal because the
ambiguity exists apart from the endorsement.
The Court may find the Missoula County District Court held an
inadequate reasonableness hearing because Westchester did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine the Homeowners’ expert witnesses or
conduct discovery. Each party advocated for a different standard to
determine the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. While Mr.
Hacker argued for the standard set forth in Tidyman’s, Mr. Hacker’s
representation of the standard is not complete. Under Tidyman’s, as a
threshold matter, the insurer must set forth specific facts that demonstrate
the confessed judgment amount is unreasonable.5 At the hearing,
however, the district court maintains the discretion to determine the
parameters of the hearing and to decide whether further discovery is
necessary.6 Because the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of
the confessed judgment rested with Westchester, and Westchester was
not permitted to conduct discovery to satisfy that burden, the Court may
find the reasonableness hearing was inadequate. To remedy this issue,
the Court may remand the case to the Missoula County District Court
and direct the court to allow Westchester to cross-examine the
Homeowners’ expert witnesses and conduct discovery as to damages.

Indep. Milk & Cream Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 216 P. 1109, 1111 (Mont. 1923).
Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154.
6
Id. at 1155.
4
5

